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Law and Childhood Psychological Experience
C. G. Schoenfeld*
p SYCHOANALYSTS HAVE LEARNED that young children (certainly
up to the age of five or six) pass through a regular series
of psychic stages and, in the main, have similar psychic experi-
ences. These stages and experiences of early childhood are not
simply lived through and then forgotten, however. On the con-
trary, remnants of them persist in the mind (though on an un-
conscious level) and frequently play a significant role during
adulthood.'
To suggest that a causal relationship exists between these
survivals of early childhood and the law may, at first sight, seem
absurd. Yet assuming that insofar as laws "are made by men, for
men, they cannot help having the nature of men in them"; 2 and
assuming further that (as psychoanalysts have discovered) the
psychic events of childhood frequently exercise a profound influ-
ence upon adults who affect and are affected by the law;3 then it
no longer seems so farfetched to postulate a relationship between
early childhood and the law.
With the foregoing in mind-and in an effort to help lawyers
identify (and possibly change) that which in the law may re-
flect unduly the influence of early childhood-this paper will de-
tail certain psychoanalytic discoveries concerning the first few
years of childhood and will try to suggest wherein traces of these
early years may have played a part in helping to mold the law.
Considerable study has been devoted by psychoanalysts to
early "ego" development-to the development of such cognitive
* B.A., Yale University; LL.B., Harvard University; Member of the New
York Bar.
1 See, for example, William V. Silverberg, Childhood Experience and Per-
sonal Destiny (New York: Springer, 1952).
2 James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers
(Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1950), 15.
3 As an example, consider the relationship between the psychic events of
early childhood and the conduct of lawyers. For relevant psychoanalytic
material, see Modlin, The Client and You-What You Are, 16 N. Y. County
B. Bull. 151, 155-156 (1959); Ranyard West, "A Psychological Theory of
Law," in Interpretations Of Modern Legal Philosophies (Paul Sayre, ed.,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 772-774; Sigmund Freud,
"Notes Upon A Case Of Obsessional Neurosis," in Collected Papers (Lon-
don: Hogarth Press, 1950), vol. I, 292-383.
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functions as memory, reason, and reality-testing. And though
psychoanalysts have been unable as yet to describe early ego de-
velopment with precision, they have been able to identify certain
stages in the maturation of a child's sense of reality.
For example, psychoanalysts are convinced of the existence
of an animistic period in early childhood of a time when children
believe that things as well as people live, feel, and react. To
quote Sandor Ferenczi (one of Sigmund Freud's leading disci-
ples): "Everything points to the conclusion that the child passes
through an animistic period in the apprehension of reality, in
which every object appears to him to be endowed with life, and
in which he seeks to find again in every object his own organs
and their activities." 4
Though it is difficult at first sight to conceive of any connec-
tion between this animistic period and the law, it is indisputable
that animistic conceptions are writ large upon Admiralty Law.
For example, Admiralty Law permits ships to sue, to be sued,
and to be held liable for the misconduct of their master or crew.5
As Holmes observed: "It is only by supposing... [that ships are]
endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiar-
ities of the maritime law can be made intelligible ....." 6 Further,
in many systems of law of the past, inanimate objects seem to
have been treated (at least for some purposes) as though they
were alive, had desires of their own, and had the ability to try
to satisfy these desires. In ancient Greece, for instance, courts
sat in judgment on inanimate objects; and if these objects (axes,
stones, and so on) were found guilty, they were outlawed and
cast beyond the State's borders.7 In England under the laws of
King Alfred, if a tree fell upon a man and killed him, the tree
was condemned and surrendered to the dead man's relatives, to
be used or abused by them.8 And during the early stages of the
common law, if a man drowned in a well, the well was to be filled
4 Sandor Ferenczi, "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality," in
Sex in Psychoanalysis (Contributions to Psychoanalysis) [New York:
Dover, 1956], 193.
5 See the appropriate references in Gustavus H. Robinson, Handbook of
Admiralty Law in the United States (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing
Co., 1939).
6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown,
1881), 26-27.
7 Id., 8, 34.
8 Id., 11, 19, 24.
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up;9 and if a man was accidentally killed by an inanimate object
in motion-be it a moving cart, a collapsing house, or whatever
-the object was condemned as an accursed thing and forfeited.'0
Admittedly, these examples, in and of themselves, fail to re-
veal the extent to which an actual, firm belief in animism existed
among the ancient Greeks, the Anglo-Saxons under the laws of
Alfred, or the English during the early days of the common law.
After all, Admiralty Law still treats ships (for certain purposes)
as though they were animate beings; yet neither admiralty law-
yers-nor the general public-really believe ships are endowed
with life. Indisputably, however, animism still retains some hold
upon the public. For one thing, psychoanalysis has shown that
animistic ideas of early childhood still affect significantly the be-
havior of certain neurotics and psychotics." And as Holmes
pointed out when discussing ancient laws that punish inanimate
objects, even a presumably normal, civilized man will "kick a
door that pinches his finger." 12 Further, it is undeniable that
animistic concepts play a major role in certain widely-practiced
religious rites-in the Holy Communion, for instance. And to
this very day, a surprisingly large number of adults still believe
-or perhaps, half-believe-in the efficacy of such talismans as
lucky coins, rabbits' feet, and the like. Indeed, still apposite is
David Hume's observation, made two hundred years ago, that:
"There is an universal tendency amongst mankind to conceive
all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those
qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which
they are intimately conscious. We find human faces in the moon,
armies in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not cor-
rected by experience and reflection, ascribe malice and goodwill
to everything that hurts or pleases us." 13
Thus, if the animism that characterizes a young child's
thinking still influences adult thought-at least to some extent;
and if systems of law of the past-and some aspects of Admiralty
Law today-reflect animistic concepts; there may be some basis
9 Id., 24-25.
10 Id., 25, 35.
1 See for example, Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1945), 205-206.
12 Holmes, op. cit. supra, n. 6, at 11.
13 See David Hume, The Natural History of Religion.
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for concluding that vestiges of the animistic stage of ego devel-
opment have affected-and continue to affect-the law.
The animistic stage is followed by a period of ego develop-
ment that psychoanalysts call the stage of the "omnipotence of
words." During this period, the child tends to overestimate
greatly the influence of words-and even appears to believe that
words can, in a physical sense, create or destroy. The period of
the omnipotence of words is, in short, a time when words seem
capable of accomplishing extraordinary things-a time of word
magic.
As traces of the animistic stage of childhood may influence
the law, so may traces of the childhood stage of the omnipotence
of words. After all, there is much in the law's attitude towards
words that strongly resembles the way children regard words
during the period of the omnipotence of words.14 For one thing,
just as these children tend to invest certain words or phrases
with a sort of magical significance, so does the law. In this light,
consider for a moment the phrase "and his heirs."
At the common law, if A, the owner of Blackacre in fee
simple, wanted to convey his full fee simple estate in Blackacre
to B, A's conveyance would have to contain the words "to B and
his heirs." If A used any other word formula, B would not get
a fee simple. If, for example, A conveyed Blackacre "to B in fee
simple," or even "to B forever," all that B would get is a life
estate in Blackacre.15 Thus, at the common law, the phrase "and
his heirs" was invested with a sort of magic: only if this phrase
were used could a successful inter vivos transfer of a fee simple
estate in land be accomplished.
Best known, however, of the word formulas or verbalizations
that the law seems to regard as somehow inherently efficacious
or magical is the judicial oath. Though this oath has assumed
various forms and has been variously defined, it is, in essence,
a solemn pledge coupled with an appeal to God, a pledge of
truthfulness taken in a judicial proceeding or in relation to some
matter connected with a judicial proceeding.'6 Historically, the
14 See the relevant comments of Jerome Frank in Law and the Modern
Mind (Sixth printing; New York: Coward-McCann, 1949), 57-68.
15 See John E. Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property (Brooklyn, New
York: Foundation Press, 1962), 41.
16 See Black's Law Dictionary (3rd ed.; St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publish-
ing, 1933), 1268.
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judicial oath is a derivative of the ordeal-an ancient mode of
trial designed to elicit supernatural help in ascertaining certain
facts.' 7 And the judicial oath may have reached the height of its
influence or significance in the common law procedure known as
"wager of law" -a mode of trial in which an accused defended
himself against a charge by getting a number of persons to swear,
not that the charge was false, but rather that the oath taken by
the accused was "clean" (that is, trustworthy),18 Today, the
judicial oath is by no means so highly regarded, if for no other
reason than the apparent willingness of many of those who take
the oath to perjure themselves. As Jerome Frank has pointed
out: "We know, alas, that an immense amount of testimony is
deliberately and knowingly false. Experienced lawyers say that,
in large cities, scarcely a trial occurs, in which some witness does
not lie." 19 Yet despite this, the judicial oath still seems to retain
(at least for some people) much of its old magic: its use is still
vigorously defended-and rarely indeed is it dispensed with.
20
Besides regarding certain words as being in some way ex-
traordinarily efficacious, the law-like the child during the pe-
riod of the omnipotence of words-tends to overestimate the in-
fluence of words.
For example, in jury trials, the law ascribes considerable
significance to the judge's charge to the jury-the slightest error
in the charge often serving on appeal as a basis for reversing the
jury's verdict. In fact, it is a commonplace that: "Decisions, in
cases which have taken weeks to try, are reversed on appeal be-
cause a phrase, or a sentence, meaningless to the jury, has been
included in or omitted from the charge." 21 The words "meaning-
less to the jury" are important here, for it is notorious that jury-
17 See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1950), 45; Max Radin, Handbook Of Anglo-American Le-
gal History (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing, 1936), 35-37.
18 See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
(2nd ed.; Rochester, New York: Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing, 1936),
109-110.
19 Frank, Courts on Trial, op. cit. supra, n. 17, at 85.
20 Most used, perhaps, of the arguments advanced in defense of the law's
continued employment of oaths is the contention that "many people who
do not hesitate to speak loosely find themselves trying very definitely to
stick closely to the facts under the sobering influence of an oath .... [A]
solemn oath ... has a distinct, salutary effect upon the tongues of the great
majority of persons." Roy Moreland, Modern Criminal Procedure (Indian-
apolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 17.
21 Frank, Courts on Trial, op. cit. supra, n. 17, at 117.
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men usually fail to comprehend completely or properly the
judge's charge-especially its nuances and subtleties. Indeed,
Jerome Frank has contended that: "It is inconceivable that a
body of twelve ordinary men, casually gathered together for a
few days, could, merely from listening to the instructions of the
judge, gain the knowledge necessary to grasp the true import of
the judge's words. For these words have often acquired their
meaning as the result of hundreds of years of professional dispu-
tation in the courts. The jurors usually are as unlikely to get the
meaning of those words, as if they were spoken in Chinese, San-
skrit, or Choctaw." 22
Frank's contentions may well be extreme. Yet it is a fact
that a judge's charge is likely to have far less impact and influ-
ence upon a jury than the law assumes. And insofar as the law
overestimates the effect of the judge's charge, the law (like the
young child) overestimates the effect of words.
This tendency of the law to exaggerate the significance of
words has also found expression in considerable strictness con-
cerning matters of form. For example, at the common law,
though a plaintiff might have conclusively proven an undeniably
valid cause of action, he would have been nonsuited if this cause
of action failed to match the word formula he had used when
beginning his suit-that is, failed to match the "form of action"
he had chosen.23 Worse, there have been cases in which convic-
tions have been reversed because a written verdict was handed
in reading "guily" rather than "guilty," or reading murder in
the "fist" degree rather than in the "first" degree. In fact, con-
victions of major felonies have been reversed "because the for-
mal conclusion of the indictment omitted the word "the" in the
constitutionally prescribed formula .... ,, 24
Another manifestation of the law's tendency to exaggerate
the importance or power of words is the assumption apparently
made by the law-akin to the assumption a child seems to make
during the period of the omnipotence of words-that words can,
in a physical sense, create or destroy. The law seems to assume,
for example, that when a judge orders a jury to disregard certain
22 Id. at 116.
23 See Frederick William Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 251-252.
24 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1945), 161.
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testimony, these instructions alone eliminate whatever effect the
testimony may have had upon the jury. But surely this assump-
tion, if made, is untenable. As Lawrence Kubie has pointed out:
"It is unrealistic to assume that the officially 'stricken out' words
do not influence feelings and thoughts merely because no one
talks about something which a lawyer has said but to which an
objection has been raised and sustained. This is as naive as is
the parent's idea that what the child does not talk about is not
affecting profoundly the child's feelings and actions." 25
Many other illustrations of the law's tendency to overestimate
the power of words could readily be cited. It is hoped, however,
that sufficient material has been considered to reveal a striking
resemblance between the law's attitude towards words and that
of the child during the period of the omnipotence of words-a
resemblance striking enough to suggest that vestiges of this pe-
riod of ego development have exerted, and continue to exert,
influence upon the law.
Besides studying early ego development, psychoanalysts
have given even more attention to the early phases of a child's
sexual development. And though psychoanalytic discoveries
concerning this sexual development are many and diverse, they
all have a common ground in Freud's finding that "it is not at all
true that the sexual impulse enters into the child at puberty, as
the devils in the gospel entered into the swine. The child has his
sexual impulses and activities from the beginning, he brings them
with him into the world, and from these the so-called normal
sexuality of adults emerges by a significant development through
manifold steps." 26
Perhaps the most significant psychic events that mark a
child's sexual development occur during a stage psychoanalysts
call the "phallic period"-a stage that usually begins when the
child reaches the age of about three and a half. During the
phallic period, the child tends to feel drawn erotically to the
parent of the opposite sex and to direct jealous and hostile im-
25 Kubie, To Break the Hold of the Past, 16 N. Y. County B. Bull 139, 142
(1959).
26 Sigmund Freud, The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis (Chi-
cago, Illinois: Henry Regnery, 1955), 49. It ought be noted that psycho-
analysts tend to employ the term "sexual" in a very broad manner, includ-
ing within its meaning various forms of bodily pleasure and such tender
emotions as affection and love. Reuben Fine, Freud: A Critical Re-
Evaluation of His Theories (New York: McKay, 1962), 13, 14.
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pulses towards the other parent. Freud coined the phrase "Oed-
ipus complex" to describe this concatenation of feelings. He de-
rived the phrase from the Oedipus legend embodied in Sophocles'
tragic drama Oedipus Rex. Freud's comments upon this drama
are among the best-known lines he ever wrote.
If the Oedipus Rex is capable of moving a modern reader or
play-goer no less powerfully than it would the contemporary
Greeks, the only possible explanation is that the effect of the
Greek tragedy does not depend upon the conflict between
fate and human will, but upon the peculiar nature of the
material by which this conflict is revealed. There must be a
voice within us which is prepared to acknowledge the com-
pelling power of fate in the Oedipus.... And there actually
is a motive in the story of King Oedipus which explains the
verdict of this inner voice. His fate moves us because it
might have been our own, because the oracle laid upon us
before our birth the very curse which rested upon him. It
may be that we were all destined to direct our first sexual
impulses towards our mothers and the first impulses of ha-
tred and violence towards our fathers; our dreams convince
us that we were. King Oedipus, who slew his father Laius
and wedded his Mother Jocasta, is nothing more or less than
a wish-fulfillment-the fulfillment of the wish of our child-
hood. But we, more fortunate than he, insofar as we have
not become psychoneurotics, have since our childhood suc-
ceeded in withdrawing our sexual impulses from our moth-
ers, and in forgetting our jealousy of our fathers. We recoil
from the person for whom this primitive wish of childhood
has been fulfilled with all the force of the repression which
these wishes have undergone in our minds since childhood.
As the poet brings the guilt of Oedipus to light by his inves-
tigation, he forces us to become aware of our own inner
selves, in which the same impulses are still extant. .... 27
By the time a child reaches his sixth birthday, his Oedipal
strivings have usually begun to subside. This may occur partly
because the time has arrived for the Oedipus complex to come
to an end, just as the child's milk teeth begin to fall out when
the time comes for his permanent teeth to erupt. But in addition,
the Oedipus complex dies out because it leads to painful dis-
appointments-and is frequently accompanied by an intense fear
of parental retaliation. 28 Further, when the Oedipus complex
27 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, in The Basic Writings of
Sigmund Freud (A. A. Brill, ed.; New York: Random House, 1938), 308.
28 Sigmund Freud, "The Passing of the Oedipus Complex," in Collected Pa-
pers (London: Hogarth Press, 1956), vol. II, 269-276.
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begins to disappear (and its disappearance generally marks the
end of the phallic period), a new psychic agency-the super-ego
-is set up in the mind, an agency that tends to engender un-
bearable feelings of anxiety whenever incestuous or parenticidal
impulses threaten to become conscious."9
At first sight, laws pertaining to family relationships would
seem to provide an appropriate starting point for considering the
possible effect of the Oedipus complex upon the law. After all,
Oedipal urges first appear in the matrix of the family and have
to do with a child's relationship with his parents (or their sur-
rogates). But much in family law-the law of domestic relations,
for example-is well-settled, and any conclusions reached here
concerning such well-settled areas of family law are likely to
have little or no practical effect. Hence, it seems best to limit
the present discussion of family law to a consideration of the
possible influence of the Oedipus complex upon that area of fam-
ily law most in flux and most in need of reform-the law of
divorce.
As Roscoe Pound and many other students of law have
pointed out, the "law of divorce is in many ways one of the most
unsatisfactory parts of American law." 30 Not only do statutes
governing divorce vary greatly from state to state-so much so
that no real pattern is discernible-but these statutes appear to
be violated more frequently than they are honored. To put it
bluntly: "wholesale evasion of the law [of divorce] ... is a daily
occurrence throughout the country." 31
Many reasons might be advanced to help explain this unfor-
tunate state of affairs. For one thing, there is no common law of
divorce; hence, the flywheel that usually ensures a reasonable
consistency in American law is missing in divorce legislation.
Further, much divorce legislation is unrealistic (in certain cases
in which a marriage seems hopelessly broken-when, for exam-
ple, both parties have committed adultery-no divorce is grant-
29 Ernest Jones, "The Genesis of the Super-Ego," in Papers on Psycho-
analysis (Fifth ed.; London: Bailliere, Tindall, and Cox, 1950), 145-152.
30 Roscoe Pound, "A Symposium in the Law of Divorce, Foreword," in Se-
lected Essays on Family Law (Paul Sayre, ed.; Brooklyn, New York:
Foundation Press, 1950), 872.
31 Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws (St. Paul, Minnesota: West
Publishing, 1959), 232.
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ed) ;32 hence, the use of fraud to circumvent such legislation can
hardly be unexpected.
In addition, however, the possibility exists that deep-rooted
inner conflicts-especially conflicts pertaining to the Oedipus
complex-may be partly responsible for the deplorable state of
American divorce law.
Consider that a divorce signifies a permanent separation of
spouses-a separation that would, in effect, fulfill the Oedipal
wish of childhood for the elimination of the main rival for the
affection of the Oedipally-loved parent. Hence the idea of divorce
may well stir up vestiges of the Oedipal desires of childhood.
And these vestiges may prove powerful enough to mold thought
and belief concerning divorce-even to the extent of finding ex-
pression in legislation regarding divorce.
But if the concept of divorce is likely to stir up Oedipal rem-
nants, it is every bit as likely to arouse remnants of the disap-
pointments and fears of childhood that originally helped to bring
the Oedipus complex to an end. And in addition, any arousal
of Oedipal remnants is likely to provoke a variety of defensive
measures--especially by the superego, which, as has been point-
ed out, is an agency of the mind that tends to engender unbear-
able anxiety whenever incestuous or parenticidal strivings
threaten to erupt. In short, the idea of divorce may well stir up
inner conflicts pertaining to the Oedipus complex, conflicts that
may express themselves (among other ways) in the crazy-quilt
pattern of American divorce legislation and in the public's failure
to insist upon divorce laws that reflect its divorce practices.
Admittedly, any hypothesis concerning a possible relation-
ship between survivals of the Oedipus complex and American
divorce legislation and practice is conjectural. Nevertheless,
lawyers ought to be aware of the possibility that Oedipal or
other inner conflicts may play a part in the formulation of
American divorce law and in the public's apparent need to pay
lip service to divorce legislation that it disregards in practice.
Once such an awareness exists, lawyers may prove far more
32 "Where both parties to a marriage have committed adultery, neither is
entitled to a divorce. This is a fundamental proposition of divorce law in
most states. The law takes the completely unrealistic position, that where
a marriage appears to be damaged beyond repair, because both the husband
and the wife are engaged in extramarital sex escapades, neither will be
awarded a divorce." Morris Ploscowe, The Truth About Divorce (New
York: Hawthorn Books, 1955), 137.
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willing than now to demand reforms that, at the very least, will
result in divorce legislation that is reasonably uniform and more
in accordance with the realities of modern American life.
Besides playing a possible role in divorce legislation (and
in other aspects of family law), Oedipal traces may also find
reflection in laws having to do with persons who consciously or
unconsciously tend to symbolize members of the family-with
employers or other typical parent-substitutes, for example. 83
Deserving attention in this light is the possibility that Oedipal
impulses may express themselves in labor relations and labor
law.
Though labor relations and labor law in the United States
have received perhaps more than their share of governmental
attention during the past thirty years or so, they are still far
from satisfactory. For one thing, the problem of preventing auto-
cratic and corrupt men from seizing control of labor unions is
still unresolved. And of greater interest here, no satisfactory
way has yet been evolved to prevent what appears to be a never-
ending succession of protracted and often violent strikes.
It is possible, of course, that some simple or single cause-
premature governmental intervention in labor relations, for ex-
ample 34 -is largely responsible for these persistent strikes. Yet
it is far more likely that strikes are, as they have always been,
products of a variety of causes: economic, political, social, and
psychological.
One frequently-mentioned psychological cause of strikes
stresses their ability to help express pent-up aggressive and hos-
tile urges. That is, a strike may sometimes be precipitated not so
much by economic issues as by the likelihood that it will help
33 A variety of authority-figures (teachers, policemen, military and politi-
cal leaders, etc.) may serve as parent-substitutes. Especially relevant for
this paper's purpose, however, is the tendency of many persons to regard
employers and judges as father-substitutes. See Morris, The Psychoanalysis
of Labor Strikes, 10 Lab. L. J. 833, 834, 841 [1959]; Paul Reiwald, Society
and Its Criminals (New York: International Universities Press, 1950), 42-
65.
34 ,... it is in a certain sense regrettable that positive labor relations legis-
lation intervened before the evolutionary processes of the common law
could operate to smooth out . . . differences or at least pose the central
issues in a succinct and manageable manner. It is entirely possible that
certain problems which vex labor relations law today, even under the com-
prehensive statutes, might have been solved sooner and more satisfactorily
had the common law had more time to clarify the issues, if not to advance
definitive solutions." Sylvester Petro, The Labor Policy of the Free Society(New York: Ronald Press, 1957), 139.
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the participants to rid themselves of aggressive tensions. To
quote Ross Stagner: "In some instances wage issues are intro-
duced only as an after-thought, after a strike has begun. The
strike that is a spontaneous explosion of aggressive tensions must
be made to appear rational." 35
The roots of these aggressive and hostile strivings have by
no means been fully exposed. Yet, as Joel Morris has suggested,
such strivings may well be partly Oedipal in origin.36
Consider that, as pointed out earlier, employers are often
regarded as parent or father-substitutes.3 Hence remnants of
the hostile father-oriented Oedipal feelings of employees may
readily be deflected onto employers-especially if, as is usually
the case, it is unthinkable or socially unacceptable for an em-
ployee to display these feelings towards his actual father. When
employer-employee relations are peaceful, such hostile Oedipal
feelings may remain latent; and, indeed, employees may feel to-
wards their employers as towards a benevolent father. But
when employees have or imagine they have reason for dissatis-
faction, hostile Oedipal impulses are likely to be stirred up and
to help precipitate-or at least to express themselves in-strikes
and other forms of industrial discord.
This theory (suggested by Morris) concerning the kinship
of Oedipal aggression and strikes is admittedly speculative. In-
disputably, however, employees (in fact, most persons) do re-
gard employers as parent-substitutes; and Oedipal feelings con-
cerning parents are frequently deflected onto employers. Hence
there is certainly some basis for believing that Oedipal remnants
may play a role in labor relations. Further, insofar as those re-
sponsible for molding labor laws (judges, legislators-indeed, the
general public) tend to regard employers as parent-substitutes,
labor law itself is likely to reflect the influence of Oedipal traces.
In fact, this may help explain why labor law is still far from
satisfactory-and why traditional legal restraints that help to
prevent protracted and violent disputes among individuals may
ultimately have to become part of labor law.
Like employers, judges may frequently serve as parent or
father-substitutes. Indeed, judges are among the most ubiquitous
35 Ross Stagner, Psychology of Industrial Conflict (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1956), 424.
36 Morris, op. cit. supra, n. 33, at 833-842.
37 See supra, n. 33.
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of father-symbols.38 Hence there is reason to suppose that sur-
vivals of father-oriented Oedipal feelings may be displaced onto
judges and may therefore affect beliefs concerning judges. As
an example, consider the once-prevalent belief that judges find
but do not make law.
Today it is usually taken for granted that judges can, and
do, make law.3 9 Judge-made law is, as Cardozo put it, "one of
the existing realities of life." 40 Yet up to about thirty years ago,
the prevalent American view was that judges merely discover
and apply existing law.
41
This erroneous view of the role judges play may have taken
hold in the United States partly because of historical reasons-
partly because Blackstone (who exerted an enormous influence
on early American law) declared unequivocally that judges were
"not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and ex-
pound the old one." 42 Also, as Jerome Frank has suggested, the
view that judges simply discover and announce existing law may
have been, albeit in part, the product of a widespread and
strongly-held desire for an unalterably stable legal order.
43
In addition, however, the possibility exists that the belief
that judges find but do not make law may have reflected the
influence of vestiges of the Oedipal impulses of childhood. That
is (as pointed out above), judges are often regarded as parent
or father-substitutes-and as such, probably receive Oedipal
feelings. Insofar as these deflected Oedipal feelings are "posi-
tive," judges would tend to be looked upon with increased ad-
miration and respect; and an attempt might even be made to
increase the scope of their judicial powers. But to the extent
that this Oedipal material is "negative," it might well find ex-
pression in criticism of judges-and more especially, in a wish
to limit their powers. This wish, in turn, may adopt a number
of guises, including the wish-fulfilling belief that judges lack the
power to make law.
38 See Reiwald, op. cit. supra, n. 33, at 42-65.
39 See, for example, William Seal Carpenter, Foundations of Modern Juris-
prudence (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958), 222.
40 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1921), 10.
41 Frank, Law and the Modem Mind, op. cit. supra, n. 14, at 32-33.
42 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Do Judges Make or Discover Law?" Pro-
ceedings of the American Philosophical Society, v. 91, no. 5, D' 1947, p. 405.
43 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, op. cit. supra, n. 14, at 34-36.
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The preceding suggestion concerning the genesis of the once-
prevalent belief that judges find but do not make law is admit-
tedly speculative. And in addition, it appears to ignore the tend-
ency of judges themselves to believe they lacked the power to
make aw 44 -unless the assumption can be made that these
judges displaced their hostile Oedipal feelings onto themselves.
Yet, paradoxically, something akin to this may actually have
happened.
Consider that the first lawmakers or judges that a child
knows are his parents-more especially, perhaps, his father. As
Jerome Frank has phrased it: "To the child the father is the In-
fallible Judge, the Maker of definite rules of conduct. He knows
precisely what is right and what is wrong and, as head of the
family, sits in judgment and punishes misdeeds." 45 These child-
hood impressions of the father (vestiges of which probably re-
main in the mind) may cause a man who is made a judge to re-
act unconsciously as though he had usurped his father's place.
And as a result, Oedipal urges still extant in him may well be
aroused.
But if a man's Oedipal urges are aroused, it is likely that
his inner defenses against the resurrection of these urges would
also be aroused. For one thing, his superego (the basic function
of which is to help control incestuous and parenticidal im-
pulses) 46 would probably spring into action, direct angry and
hostile impulses against his ego, and thereby engender consider-
able anxiety. To help assuage this anxiety, the man might try-
albeit unconsciously-to convince himself that in becoming a
judge he had in no way taken his father's place. And he might
succeed in doing this by asserting and believing that, unlike the
father of childhood ("the Maker of definite rules of conduct"),
he had no power to make law.
Not only erroneous beliefs concerning the powers of judges,
but also actual restrictions upon their powers may reflect the
influence of Oedipal strivings. For example, Oedipal traces may
be partly responsible for the limitations on judicial powers im-
plicit in the use of accusatorial (rather than inquisitorial) crim-
inal proceedings in the United States-and perhaps even partly
44 Id. at 37.
45 Id. at 18.
46 See Jones, "The Genesis of the Super-Ego," op. cit. supra, n. 29, at 145-
152.
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responsible for the persistence of the jury system in the United
States.
Special historical circumstances (the revulsion and outrage
engendered by the inquisitorial methods of the Court of Star
Chamber, for example, and especially the furor aroused by the
Star Chamber trial of "Freeborn John" Lilburne)-such circum-
stances alone may well explain why accusatorial courtroom prac-
tices were ultimately adopted in England and the United States,
and why English and American judges therefore began to play
a far less active role in criminal proceedings than did their
counterparts in countries employing inquisitorial techniques.4 7
Hence it may be unrealistic to suggest that Oedipal hostility
displaced from fathers onto judges was a significant cause of the
abandonment of inquisitorial procedures in the United States
and of the resultant adoption of accusatorial limitations upon the
powers of American judges.
However, no special historical circumstances appear capable
of explaining completely why-despite the appearance of ex-
tremely serious abuses-this accusatorial system has persisted so
long in the United States. It is true that the anti-professional,
equalitarian movement of a century ago was in large measure
responsible for the imposition of new and extraordinarily strin-
gent restrictions upon the powers of American judges. 48 Yet
even so, this movement of long ago can hardly be considered
sufficient reason to explain fully why modern judges appear to
lack the power to stem what seems to be an ever-rising tide of
perjured testimony.49 Nor, indeed, do these or other special his-
torical circumstances appear capable of explaining completely
why stringent limitations continue to be imposed upon the in-
vestigatory powers of judges-limitations that seem to have en-
gendered a concomitant increase in (and with this increase,
horrendous abuses of) the investigatory powers of the police.50
In view of all this, it is certainly conceivable that some psycho-
logical factor-the displacement of Oedipal hatred from fathers
onto judges, for example-though perhaps not a significant cause
47 See John Henry Wigmore, The Law of Evidence (3rd ed.; Boston, Mass.:
Little, Brown, 1940), v. 8, §§ 2250 et. seq.
48 See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Challenge of Law Reform (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955), 51-53.
49 See Frank, Courts on Trial, op. cit. supra, n. 17, at 85-86.
50 For an illuminating collocation of material regarding police brutality, see
Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels (New York: Harper, 1942), 317-324.
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of the original adoption of accusatorial criminal procedures in
the United States, is in part responsible for the persistence of
these procedures. That is, the persistence of accusatorial re-
strictions upon the powers of judges may reflect hostility un-
consciously deflected from fathers onto the judge as a parent-
symbol.
A more likely example, however, of the effect of Oedipal
traces upon the powers of judges can perhaps be found in the
persistence of what is, in a sense, the most significant restriction
upon the powers of American judges: the jury.
Though the ancient Greeks had a jury system, and the pre-
cursor of the English jury is perhaps to be found in ninth century
France, the "modern" jury is essentially an Anglo-American in-
stitution, one that has existed in the United States since colonial
times.51 Further the continuance of the jury system in the
United States is in effect guaranteed by the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments to the Constitution and by analogous provisions in
the constitutions of almost all the fifty states.52 Yet in recent
times, the American jury system has become the target of force-
ful criticism.55
One frequently-heard criticism is that jury trials take an
inordinate amount of time and are therefore probably respon-
sible for much of the court congestion and delay that now mark
the administration of justice. Another much-used argument is
that juries are often unable-and frequently unwilling-to apply
the instructions of the court. Hence juries are likely to go be-
yond their proper role as finders of the facts and to try to deter-
mine as well the legal rights and duties of the parties. Related
to this argument is the contention that juries are often moved
by ignorance, prejudice, and passion; and as a result, their deci-
sions are likely to be unpredictable, arbitrary-and erroneous.
Such contentions are by no means unanswerable. After all,
just as the decisions of juries may be arbitrary, unpredictable,
and subject to passion, so may the decisions of judges. 54 Further,
51 Frank, Courts on Trial, op. cit. supra, n. 17, at 108-109.
52 See Charles W. Joiner, Civil Justice and the Jury (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 58.
53 See, for example, Frank, Courts on Trial, op. cit. supra, n. 17, at 108-145.
54 "We constantly hear that the jury is arbitrary, unpredictable, and sub-
ject to passion .... But do not decisions by judges in absence of juries
sometimes appear to exhibit these same qualities?" Joiner, op. cit. supra,
n. 52, at 70.
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a recent study of court congestion and delay (a study that sum-
marizes five years' research conducted under the auspices of
The University of Chicago Jury Project) reveals that the delay
caused by jury trials is by no means so great as many critics
have contended, and goes on to suggest that the remedy for the
delay may not be to abolish the jury trial but rather "to speed it
up." 55 Moreover, as partisans of the jury repeatedly assert:
"The fact that the jury is a sort of 'group mind' gives it peculiar
advantages over the judge .... [For example, the] weighing of
the evidence and the matter of guilt or innocence by a composite
group, the jury, is more apt to result in a verdict that is accept-
able to the community and in accord with its mores." 56
The appeal of the arguments and counterarguments sketched
above is, admittedly, intellectual rather than emotional. Yet
there can be little doubt that the attitude towards the jury of
many Americans-especially their traditional fondness for and
attachment to the jury-is in part emotionally motivated. And
this emotional motivation may well reflect the influence of Oed-
ipal remnants.
After all, as pointed out above, the jury constitutes what is
perhaps the most significant restriction upon the power of
American judges. In civil jury trials, for example, it is the jury
and not the judge who usually finds the facts and renders the
verdict; and in criminal prosecutions, a judge lacks the power to
reverse a jury verdict of acquittal, even though he may believe
the verdict to be palpably erroneous. Consider also that, as
pointed out several times, judges are among the most ubiquitous
of parent or father-symbols; and as such, may frequently become
targets for Oedipal hostility deflected from fathers. In view of
all this, is it not possible-perhaps even likely-that the strin-
gent restrictions upon the powers of judges implicit in the jury
system serve as a conduit for and as a means of expressing Oed-
ipal hostility displaced from fathers onto judges? And if so, is it
not conceivable that the fondness and attachment to the jury ex-
hibited by so many Americans-an attitude that ultimately finds
expression in the persistence of the jury in the United States-
may well be based in part upon this very ability of the jury sys-
tem to function as a vehicle for expressing Oedipal hostility?
55 Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court
(Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1959), 10.
56 Moreland, op. cit. supra, n. 20, at 240.
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Speculative these possibilities surely are. Yet knowing about
them-knowing that the persistence of the jury system in the
United States may reflect the influence of Oedipal traces-can
prove useful. For one thing, this knowledge may facilitate a
more objective study of the jury than has hitherto been possible
-a study that may help eliminate those defects of the jury sys-
tem that have given rise to demands for its abolition.
This paper has sought to relate law to the first few years of
childhood. To this end, psychoanalytic discoveries concerning
stages and experiences of early childhood have been described,
and an attempt has been made to show how vestiges of these
stages and experiences may have influenced such aspects of the
law as the persistence of the jury system, the animism that per-
vades Admiralty Law, the deplorable state of Divorce Law, the
failure of Labor Law to prevent violent strikes, the belief that
judges find but do not make law, the continuance of stringent
accusatorial restrictions upon the powers of judges, and the
stress placed by the law upon certain verbal formulas ("to A and
his heirs," for example).
Admittedly, only one complex of sexual experiences (the
Oedipus complex) and only two stages of ego development (the
animistic stage and the period of the omnipotence of words)
were considered. Further, much of the material presented-
especially regarding the effect of the Oedipus complex upon the
law-was highly speculative. Nevertheless, this paper will have
fulfilled its purpose if it is able to help lawyers begin to identify
-and possibly do something about-those aspects of law that are
likely to reflect unduly the influence of traces of the stages and
experiences of early childhood. And law may well reflect this
influence, for (as pointed out at the beginning of this paper) in-
sofar as laws "are made by men, for men, they cannot help hav-
ing the nature of men in them." 57
57 See supra, n. 2.
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